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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal raises the issue of whether the defendant, 
Freddie Marmolejos, is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2255 and resentencing by the district court, in light of a 
post-sentencing amendment to the application notes to 
S 2D1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 
Because we hold that the amendment clarified the existing 
application note, rather than effecting a substantive change 
in the law, Marmolejos is entitled to relief and resentencing. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the district court and remand 
for resentencing with consideration given to the amendment 
to the application note. 
 
I. 
 
In June 1991 Marmolejos was convicted of conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846. The jury 
found him not guilty of possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine under 21 U.S.C. S 841. The evidence showed that 
he had negotiated a purchase of 5.00 kg of cocaine but had 
delivered only 4.96 kg at the time of the sale. Using this 
5.00 kg figure, the district court sentenced Marmolejos in 
October 1991 to 126 months in prison, based upon the 
version of Application Note 12 to U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1 that was 
in effect at that time. After we affirmed the conviction in 
August 1992, Marmolejos challenged his sentence by filing 
a petition in March 1995 for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2255. However, the district court denied the motion and 
we affirmed. 
 
In April 1996 Marmolejos then filed a second S 2255 
habeas motion for relief from the district court's judgment.1 
He contended that his sentencing offense level should have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Marmolejos was not subject to the new restrictions on successive 
habeas petitions contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, because his second habeas petition was filed five 
days prior to the April 24, 1996, date on which the Act took effect. 
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been based solely on the 4.96 kg of cocaine he actually 
distributed, rather than on the 5.00 kg of cocaine he 
intended to distribute as a member of the conspiracy. The 
difference was weighty, for Marmolejos's sentence could 
have been reduced by five to twenty-nine months if he was 
correct.2 In support of his claim, Marmolejos argued that 
Amendment 518 to the Guidelines, which changed 
Application Note 12 effective November 1, 1995, should 
apply to his offense, and that he should be resentenced so 
that the amendment could be applied in sentencing him. 
The district court, though, rejected Marmolejos's contention 
and denied both his habeas motion and his motion for 
reconsideration, holding that the amendment was not to be 
given retroactive effect. Marmolejos then filed an appeal, 
which we agreed to consider. We have jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2253(a), and we exercise 
plenary review of the district court's ruling. See United 
States v. Higgins, 128 F.3d 138, 139 (3d Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 722 (1998). 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
Section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines establishes 
the base offense level for defendants who act as parties to 
an agreement or conspiracy to sell narcotics, based upon 
the quantity of drugs involved. Application Note 12 to 
S 2D1.1 addresses the method of determining the 
appropriate quantity if the offense involves negotiation to 
traffic in narcotics.3 Prior to November 1995, Application 
Note 12 provided as follows: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The 4.96 kg figure which Marmolejos posited yields a base offense 
level of thirty, whereas the 5.00 kg figure on which he was sentenced 
yields a level of thirty-two. The guideline range for a base offense level 
thirty with a criminal history category of one is 97-121 months. U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 5A (1998). Thus, because Marmolejos 
was sentenced to 126 months in prison, his sentence could have been 
reduced by anywhere from five to twenty-nine months. 
 
3. The parties have not challenged, nor do we address, the district 
court's reliance on this application note in determining the appropriate 
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       In an offense involving negotiation to traffic in a 
       controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in 
       an uncompleted distribution shall be used to calculate 
       the applicable amount. However, where the courtfinds 
       that the defendant did not intend to produce and was 
       not reasonably capable of producing the negotiated 
       amount, the court shall exclude from the guideline 
       calculation the amount that it finds the defendant did 
       not intend to produce and was not reasonably capable 
       of producing. 
 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C at 858 (1998). 
 
Attempting to follow this application note in sentencing 
Marmolejos, the district court used "the weight under 
negotiation" -- namely, 5.00 kg -- as the relevant quantity. 
However, four years after Marmolejos was sentenced, 
Amendment 518 to the Guidelines deleted the language of 
Application Note 12 and inserted a new set of instructions 
in its place. As amended, the application note now reads: 
 
       In an offense involving an agreement to sell a 
       controlled substance, the agreed-upon quantity of the 
       controlled substance shall be used to determine the 
       offense level unless the sale is completed and the 
       amount delivered more accurately reflects the scale of 
       the offense. For example, a defendant agrees to sell 500 
       grams of cocaine, the transaction is completed by the 
       delivery of the controlled substance - actually 480 
       grams of cocaine, and no further delivery is scheduled. 
       In this example, the amount delivered more accurately 
       reflects the scale of the offense. In contrast, in a 
       reverse sting, the agreed-upon quantity of the 
       controlled substance would more accurately reflect the 
       scale of the offense because the amount actually 
       delivered is controlled by the government, not by the 
       defendant. If, however, the defendant establishes that 
       he or she did not intend to provide, or was not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
sentence for Marmolejos. It appears that because of the unusual facts 
here -- namely, that Marmolejos was convicted of conspiracy but 
acquitted of the underlying offense -- negotiation to traffic is the most 
apt description of Marmolejos's offense. 
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       reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-upon 
       quantity of the controlled substance, the court shall 
       exclude from the offense level determination the 
       amount of controlled substance that the defendant 
       establishes that he or she did not intend to provide or 
       was not reasonably capable of providing. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
Marmolejos argues that this new language "clarifies" the 
prior guideline in that it provides for the test in a completed 
distribution, which his was, so as to clear up the ambiguity 
that previously existed due to the Sentencing Commission's 
failure to provide for completed distributions in the 
application notes. He maintains further that if we agree 
that this is a clarifying amendment, we should remand for 
resentencing so as to give the sentencing court the 
opportunity to consider the additional clarifying language. 
 
Marmolejos's argument is based on the established 
principle that a post-sentencing amendment to a 
sentencing guideline or its comments should be given effect 
if it "clarifies" the guideline or comment in place at the time 
of sentencing. If, however, the amendment effects a 
substantive change in the law, the defendant does not reap 
the benefit of the new provision. See U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual S 1B1.11(b)(2) (1998); Isabel v. United 
States, 980 F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that this is 
the rule in "virtually all circuits"); United States v. 
Ofchinick, 877 F.2d 251, 257 n.9 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
The district court did not employ this test, but, rather, 
held that because Amendment 518 was not listed in 
S 1B1.10 of the Guidelines -- which specifies the 
amendments that are to have retroactive effect -- the 
change had no impact on Marmolejos's sentence. Yet the 
law is clear that "courts can give retroactive effect to a 
clarifying (as opposed to substantive) amendment 
regardless of whether it is listed in U.S.S.G. S 1B1.10." 
United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1109 (4th Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1830 (1996). Moreover, as 
Marmolejos has noted and as the government has 
conceded, S 1B1.10 is not relevant to our consideration of 
the instant S 2255 motion, because Marmolejos does not 
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base his motion on a post-sentence amendment lowering 
the guideline range applicable to his offense. He seeks 
review only of whether the court used the proper drug 
quantity in calculating his prison term. Therefore, the sole 
question before us is whether Amendment 518 has, by its 
terms, clarified the existing commentary in the Guidelines 
or substantively changed its meaning. If the former, 
Marmolejos's petition for habeas relief should be granted 
and the district court should consider the amendment at a 
resentencing hearing. If the latter, Marmolejos's motion 
should be denied and the amendment should be given no 
effect. 
 
B. 
 
There is no bright-line test for determining whether an 
amendment to the Guidelines "clarifies" the existing law; 
"these categories [are] unclear, and as is usually the case, 
there are factors supporting either side." United States v. 
Prezioso, 989 F.2d 52, 53 (1st Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 
Among other things, the courts look to the language of the 
amendment, United States v. Nissen, 928 F.2d 690, 694-95 
(5th Cir. 1991), the amendment's purpose and effect, 
Capers, 61 F.3d at 1110, and "whether, as a matter of 
construction, the guideline and commentary in effect at 
that time is really consistent with the amended manual." 
United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1405 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Under the former version of Application Note 12, the 
Sentencing Commission had addressed only "the weight 
under negotiation in an uncompleted transaction" as the 
basis to calculate the applicable amount for sentencing, 
unless the defendant "did not intend to produce and was 
not reasonably capable of producing" this amount. U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C at 858 (1998) 
(emphasis added). The prior text of the application note 
provided no guidance as to what amount of drugs a court 
should consider in sentencing a defendant convicted of 
participating in a completed transaction. Thus, the terms of 
the previous application note were facially ambiguous; the 
note spoke only to uncompleted deals. 
 
By contrast, the amended commentary provides that "the 
agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance shall be 
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used to determine the offense level unless the sale is 
completed and the amount delivered more accurately 
reflects the scale of the offense." Id. As a result, Application 
Note 12 now specifies that the actual weight delivered, 
rather than the weight under negotiation, should be used 
for calculating a defendant's sentence if the sale was 
completed. Marmolejos argues that this change fills a 
textual void in the language of the commentary and clarifies 
the Guidelines by resolving the ambiguity created by the 
preceding version of the application note. 
 
Marmolejos's argument that the removal of the ambiguity 
renders the amendment a clarification is buttressed by the 
opinion of the only other circuit to have addressed this 
issue. In United States v. Felix, 87 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 
1996), the defendant, like Marmolejos, argued for 
application of Amendment 518 so that his sentence would 
be calculated with reference to the amount of drugs 
actually delivered, rather than by reference to the weight of 
the drug sale he had negotiated. The Ninth Circuit noted 
that the "prior version of Application Note 12 was silent as 
to the amount of cocaine to be considered in a completed 
transaction," and concluded that "until Application Note 12 
was amended, the appropriate weight of drugs to consider 
in a completed transaction was ambiguous; a court might 
sentence on the amount under negotiation or the amount 
delivered." Id. at 1060. Thus, it, too, held that "by 
specifying the weight to consider in a completed 
transaction, the current version of Application Note 12 
clarifies the Guidelines, and should be given retroactive 
effect." Id.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Felix also found support for this conclusion in a statement from the 
Sentencing Commission regarding Amendment 518. The Sentencing 
Commission had written that Amendment 518 was adopted, in part, 
because "[d]isputes over the interpretation of this application note have 
produced much litigation." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C at 
860 (1998). Felix concluded that this demonstrated that Amendment 518 
was intended to clarify an ambiguity under the prior commentary. 87 
F.3d at 1060. However, a review of the eight cases cited in the comment 
reveals that the "disputes" referred to a circuit split concerning the 
burden of proof in S 2D1.1, not to disputes as to the calculation of drug 
quantities as such. Consequently, unlike the Felix court, we do not find 
the Sentencing Commission's comments helpful in resolving the issue 
before us. 
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The government advances two arguments in support of 
its view that the amendment effected a substantive change 
in the law, rather than a clarification. First, the government 
claims that Amendment 518 substantively changed the 
Guidelines because it revised the note in a way that 
conflicted with the developing caselaw. Most courts 
construing the prior version of Application Note 12 had held 
that a court should use the negotiated amount of drugs 
when calculating the base offense level for a defendant 
involved in a completed transaction. See, e.g., United States 
v. Buggs, 904 F.2d 1070, 1078 (7th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1369-71 
(11th Cir. 1990).5 Therefore, the government argues, the 
amendment necessarily changed the law by requiring the 
courts to consider the actual amount of narcotics sold, 
rather than the amount negotiated, when sentencing 
defendants convicted of participating in completed deals. 
 
Our answer to this, however, is that merely because the 
courts were resolving an ambiguity in the prior law by 
supplying a meaning that was neither stated in, nor clear 
from, the language of the application note, does not mean 
that the new wording has fashioned a substantive change 
to the Guidelines. In fact, one could posit that quite the 
opposite was the case -- that the new language was 
fashioned to clarify the ambiguity made apparent by the 
caselaw. In any event, while Amendment 518 may alter the 
practice of the courts in construing S 2D1.1, and may even 
reverse the caselaw interpreting Application Note 12, it is 
the text of the amendment -- not the courts' gloss on that 
text -- that ultimately determines whether the amendment 
is a clarification or a substantive revision.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In fact, most of these courts simply assumed that Application Note 12 
required using the negotiated quantity in completed transactions, writing 
that "[u]nder the sentencing guidelines, the amount of the drug being 
negotiated, even in an uncompleted distribution, shall be used to 
calculate the total mount [sic] in order to determine the base level." 
United States v. Perez, 871 F.2d 45, 48 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 
6. It should be noted that the evolving caselaw would be viewed 
differently if the new language raised ex post facto issues by resulting 
in 
an increase in the defendant's sentence. Here, however, we have no ex 
post facto concerns, because application of Amendment 518 would 
reduce, rather than increase, Marmolejos's term of imprisonment. 
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We explored a similar dilemma in United States v. 
Joshua, 976 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1992), where we held that a 
court could consider a change to a guideline's text despite 
the fact that it mandated a result different from that 
reached by a prior panel. The defendant in Joshua argued 
that the district court should have used an amendment to 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2 clarifying the definition of a "crime of 
violence" to lower his sentence under the Guideline's career 
offender provisions. The difficulty was that, 
"[u]nfortunately, this amendment to the commentary 
urge[d] us to interpret the guideline in a manner 
inconsistent with two recent decisions of this court." Id. at 
852. Nevertheless, after reviewing the Sentencing 
Commission's role in the statutory scheme, we concluded 
that the Commission, like an administrative agency, has 
the authority to overturn precedent in order to clarify an 
ambiguity in the law and to promote uniformity in the 
application of a statute. Id. at 855. Indeed, "[w]here a prior 
panel of this court has interpreted an ambiguous statute in 
one way, and the responsible administrative agency later 
resolves the ambiguity another way, this court is not bound 
to close its eyes to the new source of enlightenment." Id.7 
Therefore, we do not view the inconsistency between the 
caselaw and the amendment to Application Note 12 as 
requiring a conclusion that the amendment works a 
substantive change. 
 
We are similarly unpersuaded by the government's 
second contention -- that the commentary to Amendment 
518 evinces an intent to create a substantive change in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Supreme Court has since disagreed in part with the analogy we 
employed in Joshua, writing that the Sentencing Commission's 
commentary in the Guidelines is more "akin to an agency's interpretation 
of its own legislative rules," rather than to an agency's construction of 
a 
federal statute that it administers. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 
36, 
44-45 (1993). Nevertheless, Sentencing Commission commentary still 
remains "controlling authority," id. at 45, that is to be applied in all 
but 
the most limited circumstances. Id. at 38. Therefore, we believe that the 
basic principle of Joshua remains good law; because of the Sentencing 
Commission's broad power to interpret the Guidelines, clarifying 
amendments should be considered by the sentencing court despite any 
conflict with established precedent, unless ex post facto concerns are 
present. 
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law. The Sentencing Commission's explanation of 
Amendment 518 states that "this amendment revises the 
Commentary to S 2D1.1 to provide that in a case involving 
negotiation for a quantity of a controlled substance, the 
negotiated quantity is used to determine the offense level 
unless the completed transaction establishes a different 
quantity." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C at 
860 (1998) (emphasis added). The government asserts that 
the Sentencing Commission used the word "revises" to 
illustrate that Amendment 518 effected a substantive 
change. Had the Commission intended merely to clarify the 
existing guideline, the government argues, it would have 
used the term "clarifies" rather than the term "revises," as 
it did in drafting several other amendments. 
 
We disagree. As an initial matter, the manner in which 
the Commission describes a guideline amendment is not 
dispositive. As we made clear in Bertoli, "our own 
independent interpretation of the pre-amendment language 
is controlling," 40 F.3d at 1407 n.21, and the mere fact 
that an amendment is referred to as a clarification or a 
revision is ordinarily of slight import to our analysis. 
 
Additionally, the Commission's use of the term "revises" 
in this instance reveals little about the intended effect of 
Amendment 518. The Commission states that Amendment 
518 "revises the Commentary to S 2D1.1," to which we 
respond: of course it does. It "revises" the commentary in 
the same way that every amendment revises the 
commentary -- by changing, altering, or modifying the text. 
The amendment does not say that it `revises the method by 
which the courts determine the correct quantity of drugs 
for sentencing purposes under S 2D1.1,' or that it revises 
the calculation of drug quantities under the Guidelines. 
Rather, it states simply that it "revises the Commentary" 
language itself. Therefore, we do not believe that the 
Commission's use of the term "revises" informs our decision 
as to whether its intent was to substantively change the 
law. 
 
The line between a clarification and a revision may be a 
fine one, but we believe the difference can be discerned in 
this case. Amendment 518 does not change the method for 
calculating amounts involved in uncompleted sales, but 
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merely clarifies the proviso for completed ones. Accordingly, 
we conclude that Amendment 518 to the Sentencing 
Guidelines represents a clarification of the previous 
application note, because it fills a void and resolves an 
ambiguity in S 2D1.1 regarding the proper weight of drugs 
for a court to consider in sentencing a defendant involved 
in a completed narcotics transaction. 
 
III. 
 
The district court's Orders dated June 11, 1996, and 
July 29, 1996, will be REVERSED, the judgment of 
sentence will be VACATED, and the cause will be 
REMANDED for resentencing and other proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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